Abstract. International Humanitarian Laws of Armed Conflict effectively prohibit the use of terror-violence as a means or method of warfare in all circumstances of armed conflict. However, as new "terrorist" enemies do not appear to share this humanitarian consensus, it becomes crucial to contextualise accurately any characterisation of the recent "war" on "global terror" as a "war" to which International Humanitarian Law can attach. What needs to be remembered, first, is that technological innovation can destabilise accepted frameworks for waging war. Thus, any laws intended to curtail the use of particular means and methods of warfare will reflect the contemporaneous environment within which such laws were formulated. Secondly, modern laws of war evolved from nineteenth century reciprocal pacts designed to ensure minimal levels of restraint between "civilised" peoples. While any strict contractual approach to mutuality-in-restraint has been superceded in the post-1945 era by more universalised obligations, the interests reflected in this original mutuality of interest warrant examination when distinguishing today between "justifiable" and "unjustifiable", or "licit" and "illicit", uses of violence.
To a fanatical savage, a bomb dropped out of the sky on the sacred temple of his omnipotent God is a sign and a symbol that that God has withdrawn his favour. 1
Introduction
Assuming, for purposes of argument, that war is employed to pursue an economic agenda, as is often the case, the rationale for the use of force can be something as straightforward as access to or control of territory. At this point, the twin motives of war and economics are joined by their helpmeets "liberation-rhetoric" and "terrorism." Justificatory liberation-rhetoric is rarely very far away in economics-grounded warfare, and it is little surprise that the most common type of armed conflict since 1945 has been that for national liberation in one form or another. The impulse for these and other "mixed" (internal-external) wars in the post-1945 era has been the struggle of peoples for self-determination, 2 the principle of which is found within an U.N. Charter system which (a) prohibits inter-state armed aggression, 3 and (b) envisages a smooth transition into independence or self-government of former colonial or trust territories.
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The purpose of this discussion, however, is to explore the extent to which a greater reliance on terror-war risks the collapse of "rules" of war. An interesting aspect of modern armed conflicts is the importance increasingly given to the use of terror as a type of weapon, as new technologies permit considerations of efficiency-in-result 5 to outweigh more traditional wartime guidelines of proportionality and military necessity. 6 There is also abundant evidence that any sense of shared values in relation to the conduct of terrorwar may be more illusory than real. For example, the internet simultaneously quickens the speed of communications, and lessens the importance of state territory. The changed nature of warfare produced by early twentieth century industrialisation effectively removed much protection for civilian workers, who became those first targeted; the communications revolution similarly places in some doubt the degree to which perceptions of legitimacy regarding "lawful" means and methods of warfare still exist. The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on the World Trade Center in New York, and on the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., illustrate well the consequences of the mis-use of any new technology, the sheer openness of access to which now must give much cause for concern.
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To what extent can a "war on global terror" be a "war" at all? The origins of today's laws and/or rules of war lie predominantly in the nineteenth century, in the period somewhat after the occurrence of several Western national liberation wars. 8 The entrepreneurial spirit unleashed via such wars 9 sought then to systematise warfare, in the sense of ensuring in advance certain levels of predictability of action. Steady industrialisation led to increasing calls in the West for the curtailment or restraint of the new economic competition in armaments, and the new ways of waging war such weaponry facilitated.
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Inter-governmental conferences were held to negotiate the prohibition of certain weapons and to ensure minimal levels of humanitarian treatment during war.
11 While this encouraged the outbreak of war, if only because certain rules of play were now agreed in advance, such negotiated reciprocity did work to the ultimate benefit of industrialised states by helping to ensure the material survival of each. For example, and as noted in the Preamble of the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration to renounce the use of exploding projectiles under 400 grammes weight, 12 "the only legitimate object which states should endeavour to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy." This is a very limited war objective, indeed.
What is also striking, although perhaps less so, in the early development of rules of war is a heavy emphasis on contractual relations. For example, the participation, or si omnes, clause found in Hague Convention IV of 1907,
